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ABSTRACT
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for
its successful handling of a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that
resulted in seven deaths. The public relations community applauded J&J for a swift
response and for promptly implementing actions to prevent a similar crisis from occurring
in the future. However more recently, J&J has become a poster child for poor crisis
communications amidst a flood of recalls that started in November 2009. The present study
used concepts from Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and
media framing research to develop a coding scheme for a content analysis of newspaper
coverage surrounding the 1982 Tylenol recall as well as current recalls issued by J&J from
November 2009 through April 2012. The samples included newspaper articles from New
York Times and Chicago Tribune. Results showed that most of the stories in both samples
did not evaluate J&J’s operational response or reputation overall. However, when the news
coverage did evaluate J&J, coverage from the 1982 sample was positive and evenly
balanced between favorable and unfavorable, compared to negative and unfavorable in the
current sample. Additionally, when crisis type was mentioned in the coverage, the 1982
crisis was more likely described as a victim crisis while the current crises were more likely
described as an accident or preventable crisis. When the 1982 sample was examined for
mentions of previous recalls there were none compared to 80.5% of the current sample
mentioning a previous recall. The results support the tenets of SCCT, information giving
strategies and reputation management strategies. Additionally, the results provide valuable
ii

information for crisis managers regarding the media’s inclusion or, lack thereof,
organizations’ controlled media such as news releases.
Keywords: Johnson & Johnson, crisis, recall, Tylenol, McNeill Consumer Healthcare
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Rationale for Study

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for its
successful response to a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that resulted in seven
deaths (Pauly & Hutchinson, 2005; Voreacos, Nussbaum, & Farrell, 2011; Birch, 1994). Although the
tampering resulted in seven deaths, the public relations community applauded J&J for a swift crisis
response that alerted the public of the possible danger. Additionally, J&J voluntarily issued a
massive recall and removed all of their products from store shelves to ensure that no more people
died from the tainted capsules. J&J also was lauded for providing superb communications that were
timely and informative during the time of crisis.
It appears that J&J has now become a poster child for poor crisis communications amidst a
flood of recalls that began in November 2009. In spite of its longstanding history and reputation for
providing safe products to consumers, J&J has been cited repeatedly for unsafe products by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FDA has even imposed a legal injunction against the
organization (J&J, 2011b; U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2011).
Media coverage of the crisis could be a good indication of whether or not J&J’s reputation is
being affected by the current recalls and whether or not it still holds the same esteem that it did
after its 1982 successful handling of the Tylenol tampering.
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According to Bond & Kirshenbaum (1998):
A positive article in a newspaper story or prestigious magazine can often do more for a
business than any ad can. (p. 146)

The newspaper or magazine article could be more valuable to an organization than
advertising because a third party is speaking highly of the organization instead of the organization
paying for placement of positive information in an advertisement. This consideration is important
because when news coverage reports on a crisis the tone of the article could have an impact on
consumers’ perceptions of the organization. Although the present study does not focus on the
consumer perspective and resulting behaviors and perceptions, the findings of this study could be
useful in positing possible repercussions of negative publicity and effects of positive publicity.
Research shows that news coverage is more likely to be negative. Negative publicity about
companies has become prevalent in the 21st century and news outlets generally prefer to report
negative news stories about companies, therefore it is more common for companies to receive
negative publicity than positive publicity from the press (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009).
In the case of J&J, the organization’s swift response to the 1982 tampering likely garnered positive
coverage. This is probably because the company initiated measures to address public safety.
However, J&J’s responses to the more recent recalls pale in comparison to the lauded 1982
response and could make the company an easy target for negative publicity.
The FDA does not mandate how recalls must be communicated to the public. However, the
FDA does monitor the strategies of organizations whose products are being recalled and ensures
that they are using the proper tactics to inform the public. The FDA only intervenes in extreme
cases where the organization does not alert the public of a health hazard in a timely fashion
2

(Solomon, 2009). Although organizations provide press releases about recalls to media outlets,
most recalls are never reported in the mass media. Communication research shows that news
media outlets generally prefer to report negative news coverage more than positive coverage, so
when product recalls are reported in the news the reports are more likely to be negative by the
very nature of the news business (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009).
Numerous studies show that negative press reports have long lasting impacts on the
organizations or people that they are about (Kepplinger & Gabb, 2007; Tybout, Calder, & Sternthal,
1981; Wyatt & Badger, 1984). Additionally, studies have shown that negative press reports and
advertisements can negatively influence the public’s perceptions of organizations (Garramone,
Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990). J&J’s recent series of recalls and mounting legal troubles have
attracted media attention to the company.
A cursory glance at media coverage regarding J&J’s recent recalls shows mixed perceptions
regarding J&J’s response to the crises and J&J’s reputation. When J&J’s 2009 recalls began, its
reputation was unscathed as indicated by the comment below:
It's {J&J} in the midst of its fourth product recall in a year and is the subject of 19 active
federal or state investigations or lawsuits regarding its sales, marketing pricing or billing
practices--more than three times the number of Pfizer. Yet a shiny corporate halo clings to
Johnson & Johnson, established with its legendary handling of the 1982 Tylenol poisonings
that has kept the company atop "most-admired" lists ever since. J&J ranked No. 4 on
Fortune's list of most-admired companies in March and, in a new survey by the Reputation
Institute last month, was cited as the most-reputable company in the U.S. (Neff, 2010, p. 1)
As J&J’s recall woes continued, the same journalist acknowledged how J&Js numerous
recalls appear to be affecting the brand one year later.
The seemingly unending series of product recalls that has rocked Johnson & Johnson has
cost it $1 billion in lost wholesale sales due to production shutdowns. But that's just the
beginning: It's tipped off a cascade of consequences including sliding market share,
dwindling ad budgets, lost shelf space and an incalculable blow to employee morale and
3

reputation as the company fell from No. 2 in the 2010 list of Fortune Most Admired
Companies to No. 17 this year. (Neff, 2011, p. 1)
The fact that the same journalist wrote both of these stories illustrates why a thorough
examination of news coverage is necessary to get a more accurate depiction of news coverage
surrounding J&J’s recalls.
Another point of interest is how J&J’s operational response to the crisis and its formal
response issued to news outlets are described in the news coverage. A company’s actions following
a recall of its products have significant effects on the consumers’ image of the company, brand
loyalty, and purchase intentions (Souiden & Pons, 2009).
Therefore, the present study employs the content analysis research method to examine
news coverage from the 1982 recall and the more recent recalls to describe the following: the way
that J&J’s recalls are described in media coverage, whether or not the news coverage describes
information giving strategies that J&J issues, whether or not the news coverage describes a
reputational management strategy used in J&J’s formal response to the crisis and if so which one,
and the way that the news coverage describes J&J’s overall reputation. It is crucial to evaluate
media coverage because of the immense potential publicity has to impact people’s perceptions. This
appraisal may be even more important in times of crisis since negative coverage is more likely to be
covered by the news media than positive. In the case of J&J, news coverage surrounding its recent
recalls may be more likely to contain negative elements.
Theories related to crisis communication and media effects suggest that accounts in news
coverage could help organizations in crisis identify key elements in the coverage and based on the
observation also provide guidance on the possible impact the coverage can have on the perceptions
of the organization’s publics and stakeholders.
4

Literature Review
Capitalism is a predominant economic system throughout the Western world and is the
fundamental pillar of the economic system in the United States. The capitalistic nature of the U.S.
led to the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, and although many scholars argue that it has
evolved into a new form, the underlying principles still dominate today in the 21st century
(Liodakis, 2005; Langlois 2003).
The rise of capitalism also saw the introduction of the consumerism movement. According
to Kotler (1972), “consumerism is a social movement seeking to augment the rights and power of
buyers in relation to sellers” (p. 49). Throughout history there have been several stages of the
consumerism movement that were directly related to the passage of Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906,
the Meat Inspection Act of 1906, and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 (Kotler,
1972). Originally, the Pure Food & Drug Act was enforced by the Bureau of Chemistry in the
Department of Agriculture, which became the FDA in 1930 (FDA, 2011).
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy solidified consumers’ rights further in an address to
Congress where he outlined four types of consumers’ rights: consumers’ rights to safety,
consumers’ rights to be informed, consumers’ rights to choose, and consumers’ rights to be heard
(Kennedy, 1962). The President also provided more funding and more personnel to the FDA. The
FDA was and is presently responsible for enforcing manufacturing practices that result in safe food
and drugs for consumers. Since President Kennedy first introduced the consumers’ bill of rights,
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several presidents have also added to the rights, but the basic fundamentals have not changed
(Lampman & Douthitt, 1997).
Although these standards were instituted decades ago by the US government as the
underlying principles of the FDA, it appears that there is contention among government officials,
the FDA and drug manufacturers in the 21st century (FDA, 2007). Currently, manufacturers’ failure
to adhere to government standards is prevalent. One of the most visible signs of these failures is in
the volume of product recalls issued by the FDA. Each recall that is issued by the FDA represents an
organization’s failure to meet government standards. Although there are numerous recalls posted
on the FDA’s web site, the public is most likely to learn about recalls through mass media outlets.
However, media outlets are not required to report on the recalls, but reserve the right to report on
them as they so choose. In J&J’s case, key publications have reported on the recent recall flurry such
as Bloomberg Businessweek (2011). Although this is only one example of news coverage about J&J’s
recent recalls this example illustrates the massive number of consumers that one news report can
reach. Businessweek has nearly one million paid subscribers and a total audience of 4.6 million
(Bloomberg Media, 2011). The negative nature of this report is a stark contrast to the way J&J was
lauded for its handling of a 1982 cyanide scare.

J&J’s successful handling of the Tylenol cyanide scare

J&J was well respected in the “public eye” for the way that it handled the Tylenol cyanide
tampering in the Chicago area and the seven resulting deaths (Pauly & Hutchison, 2004). On
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September 29, 1982, a 12 year old girl, Mary Kellerman died in Elk Grove, Illinois. The following
timeline maps the course of events that followed Kellerman’s death (Pienciak, 1982):

Timeline of events.



Kellerman complains of a sore throat and her parents give her Tylenol. Her parents
found her unconscious and less than two hours later she was dead. At first the
suspected cause of death is a stroke, but the autopsy reveals that she died from
cyanide poising.



On the same day about five miles north of Elk Grove, Adam Janus was experiencing
mild chest pains, so he picked up a bottle of Extra Strength Tylenol on his way home
from picking his daughter up from daycare. When Janus arrived home, he took the
Tylenol and his wife was unable to wake him less than an hour later. Janus was
pronounced dead a few hours later. The initial reason for Janus’ death was a blood
clot, but an autopsy later revealed that he also had been poisoned with cyanide.
Janus’ wife and brother were at the hospital together and returned home after the
tragic event. Both of them were severely fatigued from the day’s events and took
Tylenol to help. Less than two hours later paramedics had returned to work on
Janus’ brother and his wife who also fell ill while the paramedics were there. Janus’
brother died the same day and his wife was later removed from life support due to
complications from the cyanide-laced pills.
7



About the same time that Adam Janus was dying, Mary “Lynn” Reiner took some
Tylenol to help with pain and discomfort from the recent birth and delivery of her
fourth child. Shortly after taking the medicine, Mrs. Reiner collapsed and later died.
Authorities found several cyanide-laced pills in the bottle that Reiner had used.



The same day, Mary S. McFarland was feeling ill at work and took some Extra
Strength Tylenol. She collapsed on the job and was rushed to a local hospital where
she died shortly after. Authorities also found cyanide-laced pills in McFarland’s
bottle.



Later in the evening on the same day, Paula Prince, an airline stewardess, took Extra
Strength Tylenol for relief after work. Her body was discovered in her apartment a
day later and the cause of death was cyanide poisoning.

Seven people died over the course of three days as a result of this tampering. The person
responsible for the tampering was never found, but J&J was absolved of any wrongdoing and
described as the victim of product tampering. When using a 21st century lens, it may appear that J&J
did not act swiftly enough to alert the public after the first death which allowed six other people to
die. However, in the 1980s there was not a 24-hour news cycle and most mass communication
occurred through daily newspapers and television broadcasts, so the word about the product
tampering that caused the deaths did not spread as quickly as it would now.
In the case of this crisis, J&J was a victim because the organization did not have any control
over what happened to the pills once they had been distributed. Although J&J was not completely
aware of the root cause of the problem, the organization immediately removed all bottles of Tylenol
capsules from store shelves following the seven deaths (Mabey & Iles, 1994). More than 30 million
capsules were destroyed although they were found safe. In addition to the recall, J&J also
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established a 1-800 number for consumers to call with inquiries. The company eventually
discovered that the capsules had been laced with cyanide by an individual, so the company was not
directly at fault for the deaths. J&J united with industry representatives and the FDA to devise a
plan to prevent future tampering (Hinds, 1982). Nearly two months later, Tylenol bottles returned
to the market, with a brand new safety mechanism to prevent future tampering…tamper-resistant
packaging, which eventually became an industry standard.
In the first days following the initial tampering deaths, Tylenol lost 87% of its market share
(Barton, 2001). As a result of the massive recall, J&J’s stock value decreased by 29%, which
amounted to nearly $2.3 billion (Dowdell, Govindaraj, & Jain, 1992). Although J&J’s response was
costly, it was guided by its credo that emphasizes placing the needs and wellbeing of consumers
first. When the initial crisis occurred, J&J claimed that the crisis had garnered the most domestic
news coverage of any event since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 (Alsop,
2004). Initial media coverage of the tampering stated that it was unlikely that the cyanide was put
in the capsules at J&J’s plant (“5 Die After”, 1982; “Around the World”, 1982). J&J was able to
recover most of its original market share by the end of the year due to its effective management of
the tampering (Lewin, 1982).

The 1982 tampering was a crisis for J&J, which can be confirmed by several
communication scholars. An organizational crisis is “a specific, unexpected and non-routine
organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty
and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, &
Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). According to Weick (1988), crises are events that are distinguished by
low probability and high consequences that threaten an organization’s core. The low
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probability of the occurrence requires more sensemaking on the part of the organization
because the events that transpire are beyond normal interpretations. Sensemaking refers
to “a developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities, rather than a body of
knowledge” (Weick, 1995, p. 245). This is a crucial point for organizations experiencing
crises:
The less adequate the sensemaking process directed at a crisis, the more likely it is that the
crisis will get out of control. That straightforward proposition conceals a difficult dilemma
because people think by acting. To sort out a crisis as it unfolds often requires action which
simultaneously generates the raw material that is used for sensemaking and affects the
unfolding crisis itself. There is a delicate tradeoff between dangerous action which produces
understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion. (Weick, 1988, p. 305)
In 1986, J&J faced a similar crisis involving another Tylenol tampering. From November
2009 through April 2012 J&J experienced several crises according to the definition outlined by
Seeger et al. J&J’s recent slew of product recalls is definitely improbable and the sustained long
duration over which its recalls have continued to occur appears to be a rare occurrence in the
product recall arena. Additionally, the sensemaking that J&J leaders use during this timeframe will
be crucial to weathering the recall storm and maintaining the company’s reputation.
According to Benson (1988), J&J responded quickly in the 1982 recall and used sound
strategy to ensure that the organization’s messages were consistent throughout the duration of the
product harm crisis. The professionalism and care for consumers shown by J&J during the 1982
crisis cultivated a positive reputation among Americans that has endured into the 21st century.
However, since December 2009, J&J has been plagued with recalls, several that even
resulted in federal investigation and oversight. It is difficult to pinpoint a definitive date when J&J’s
problems began, but the December 2009 voluntary recall of Tylenol Arthritis pills will be used as
10

the starting point for this study. In December of 2009, J&J received consumer complaints about a
musty odor on some of its Tylenol pills. Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and stomach pain were the
reported effects that were identified in the recall (Harrow, 2009). In January 2010, J&J expanded
the recall to include several other medicines and also identified the source of the smell as a flameretardant chemical that was used on the pallets on which the medicine was stored (Harrow, 2009).
J&J appeared to handle this recall well by issuing a voluntary recall, but its ensuing headache came
from a flurry of additional recalls, most of which pointed to poor manufacturing practice and a lack
of oversight from leadership (Weldon, 2010).
The FDA oversees the recall process that is used as an efficient, timely and economical way
to protect consumers rather than enter into costly judicial proceedings (FDA, 2011). The 1982
Tylenol recall was a voluntary recall that J&J issued without being forced to do so by the FDA.
During the 1982 recall, J&J executives were so committed to providing safe products for consumers
that the organization instructed the public to dispose of all Tylenol capsules until they were able to
determine the cause of the deaths. Additionally, J&J and the FDA worked together harmoniously to
spread the word about the tampering to public and to devise a plan to ensure that it did not recur
(McFadden, 1982). However, more recently, it appears that J&J has diverted from its credo by
allegedly circumventing the FDA’s recall process in a phantom recall and also by providing product
after product that has been determined unsafe by the FDA (Kavilanz, 2010). The number of recalls
that J&J has issued since December 2009 is too numerous to list here, but a comprehensive list can
be found in Appendix A. This series of crises has created a precarious situation from which J&J must
recover in order to maintain its status as a trusted brand.
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Recall procedures and effects

There are three types of recalls: voluntary recalls that are initiated by an organization, those
that are issued at the recommendation of the FDA, and those that are mandated by the FDA.
Additionally, each type of recall can be categorized as follows: Class I, Class II, and Class III. Class I
recalls are placed on products that are likely to cause serious adverse health effects or death. Class
II involves products that may cause temporary medical conditions that are reversible and are highly
unlikely to result in an adverse health effect or death. Class III recalls are reserved for products that
will not cause any adverse health effects (Solomon, 2009). If an organization does not implement
the procedures and strategies necessary to rectify the issues identified in the recall(s), the FDA
reserves the right to impose more stringent penalties and even take control of the organization’s
operations.
In March 2011, J&J signed a consent decree with the FDA that will govern operations at
three of the company’s plants for at least five years (J&J, 2011b). The consent decree of
condemnation, more commonly referred to as a consent decree, is a judicial injunction that is filed
in the US Department of Justice against a defendant (FDA, 2011). An injunction is a civil judicial
process that aims to avert organizations from violating laws. The Office of Criminal Investigations
(OCI) is the FDA department that oversees the injunction process and the U.S. Attorney’s Office files
the injunctions. The OCI has very specific guidelines that are followed when the process to file an
injunction is initiated. According to the FDA,
An injunction may be considered for any significant out-of-compliance circumstance, but
particularly when a health hazard has been identified...In considering an injunction, the
agency must evaluate the seriousness of the offense, the actual or potential impact of the
offense on the public, whether other possible actions could be as effective or more effective,

12

the need for prompt judicial action, and whether it will be able to demonstrate the
likelihood of the continuance of the violation in the absence of a court order. (p. 27, 2011)
Additionally, J&J has faced allegations of executing a “phantom recall” where J&J subsidiary,
McNeil Consumer Healthcare, allegedly hired contractors to go into stores and retrieve all products
from shelves without alerting consumers to potential health hazards. The House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform has held two hearings since the recalls began to investigate
possible quality control issues in J&J plants as well as alleged corporate misdeeds (Weldon, 2010;
Coggin, 2010).
J&J announced the signing of the consent decree, and the press release that was issued
made the decree sound like recognition of the organization’s good faith effort to correct the
problems that had been identified internally (J&J, 2011b). It also made the injunction appear to be a
supportive gesture of the FDA to aid J&J in its correction of the problems. However, in contrast, the
FDA’s announcement regarding the signing of the decree painted J&J as a negligent organization
that had failed to comply with federal regulations, thus resulting in the company being under the
mandate until the FDA determined that it was no longer necessary (FDA, 2011). As J&J continues to
try to maintain operations, it also paints a rosy picture of the consent decree for prospective
employees in company job descriptions:
McNeil-PPC, Inc. {J&J subsidiary} entered into a consent decree, or agreement, with the
agency that governs certain manufacturing operations to help ensure quality and
compliance. Now is an exciting time to join our business, as we focus on reaffirming the
integrity of our iconic brands that are staples of households worldwide. (J&J, 2012)

Numerous business scholars have cited various short term and long term effects of product
recalls. Long term effects include declining revenue, decreasing value for shareholders, and overall
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reputational harm to the organization. Drug recalls affect the wealth of shareholders more than
they affect the companies that bear the actual costs of issuing and conducting the recall (Jarrell &
Peltzman, 1985).
One might assume that the competitors of a recalled product experience significant gains in
market share because their competitors are facing economic and production difficulties. However,
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that all organizations that have products in the market category
of the recalled product suffered even if they were not involved in the recalls. It has also been
suggested that multiple media reports of the same recall result in diminished returns with
consumers (Marsh, Schroeder, & Mintert, 2004).

Johnson & Johnson’s legal troubles

The consent decree that J&J entered into with the FDA was not the only legal action that has
occurred since the company’s problems began in December 2009. The company has also faced
several lawsuits during that time.
In January 2012, J&J agreed to pay a $158 million settlement to end a lengthy lawsuit filed
by the Texas Attorney General charging the company’s subsidiary, Janssen, with illegally promoting
its drug Risperdal. According to the lawsuit, J&J funded a clandestine project called the “Texas
Mediation Algorithm Project” (TMAP) by illegally soliciting the help of state officials and academics
to help promote the program that generated guidelines endorsing the organization’s drug. The
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lawsuit also charged the company with overbilling Medicaid by more than $500 million (Silverman,
2012; Citizens Commission on Human Rights International, 2012).
In January 2012, J&J also reportedly reached a deal to pay $1 billion to end a civil
investigation into its marketing and sales practices of Risperdan (Fisk, Feeley & Voreacos, 2012).
Attorney generals from nearly 40 states were considering pursuing a civil investigation together
alleging consumer fraud violations against J&J (Silverman, 2011).
At the same time, the health care giant {J&J} disclosed that an agreement in principle was
reached to settle a misdemeanor criminal charge related to marketing its Risperdal
antipsychotic, but certain undisclosed issues remain open before a settlement can be
finalized, according to the SEC filing. (Silverman, 2011, “J&J to Settle Criminal Charge,” para.
3)
J&J was also ordered to pay $327 million in South Carolina for deceptive marketing practices in
June 2011, and $257.7 million in Louisiana for making misleading safety claims (Silverman, 2011).

Johnson & Johnson’s reputation

Not only do recalls and legal proceedings of this magnitude result in financial loss, they may
also be detrimental to an organization’s reputation. Although J&J has been plagued with recalls, it is
still not completely clear whether or not its image and reputation have been damaged by the
recalls. An examination of various Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rankings indicates that J&J
has still been recognized as a good corporate citizen. J&J has been recognized as recently as 2010
and 2011 for being a good corporate citizen in spite of its recalls (Connolly, 2011; Connor. 2010).
The Corporate Citizen, a CSR magazine published by Boston College, recognized J&J for having the
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highest CSR ranking in its 2010 index. This ranking was based on a CSR index, but respondents
were lay public members who gave their opinions on organizations that were considered to have
good CSR. It should also be noted that J&J’s rank only fell slightly in The Corporate Citizen’s 2011
index to number 10 out of 50 companies.
Additionally, an advisory firm, Reputation Institute in partnership with Forbes Media,
conducted a survey of consumers that measured their good feelings towards the largest 150
companies in the United States and J&J was among the top 10 companies (Daniels, 2011). Although
respondents in these surveys only represent a small portion of US citizens, the rankings make J&J
appear to be unscathed from the slew of recalls since 2009. However, in July 2011 J&J released a
new CSR plan, “Healthy Future 2015” to perhaps re-position itself as a leader in CSR and to validate
the recognition that it has received recently (Casey, 2011).
J&J was also ranked number 14 in a survey of 400 patient groups who identified the most
reputable pharmaceutical companies (Taylor, 2012). The ranks were based on a survey of 500
influential patient groups worldwide asking them to rate pharmaceutical companies’ corporate
reputations. The survey was conducted by PatientView.
Although J&J’s reputation for good CSR may appear to be intact, the organization’s “bottom
line” has suffered as a result of the recalls and consent decree. Some of the negative effects cited by
J&J were a projected $.12 per share decrease in value and an 8.2 percent decrease in over-thecounter drug sales in the first quarter of 2011 compared to the same time period in 2010. In
addition, J&J reported that U.S. sales were down 26.8 percent (Food and Drug Letter, 2011). In stark
contrast to its Top 10 finish in CSR rankings, J&J has also been recognized as one of the 10 Most
Hated Companies in America (24/7 Wall St., 2012). The list was compiled based on consumer
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satisfaction, customer care, product pricing, and brand impressions as well as company earnings,
profit forecasts, and product development.
The jury is still out on whether or not J&J’s vitality as a company will suffer from its recall
woes.

Looking long-term, I also don't believe that recent product recalls or negative legal results
will significantly impair the juggernaut's prospects. J&J is trading for less than 15 times
average earnings and free cash flow for the past five years and a dividend yield of 3.5%, and
I continue to happily hold my shares. (Chokkavelu, 2012)
In contrast, much criticism regarding J&J’s upper management and the organization’s poor
manufacturing practices can be found in the trade publications as well as other mass media outlets.
An industry blog, FiercePharma reported the following:
Showing solidarity "across the board," a panel convened by Johnson & Johnson's board of
directors finds top executives at both JJ [J&J] and its McNeil unit blameless in an
embarrassing two-year stretch of product recalls. Translation: the panel threw McNeil
middle management under the bus… McNeil suffered from "an adversarial relationship"
between some quality-control and production staff as well as "an emphasis on production
volume" over compliance [according to the committee]. The adversity may have developed
during a rapid succession of McNeil leadership changes; those leaders "may not have had
sufficient understanding of what was taking place at the plant level," the committee said. In
addition, some equipment was outdated and insufficient. (FiercePharma, 2011)
J&J has even been ranked number one on the Flame Index which is one assessment tool that
uses an algorithm that pulls in data from more than 12,000 news sources and uses the news
coverage to rank companies (Flame Index, 2012).
The Flame Index can measure public perception for Brand Risk Management. The real-time
data allows instant measurement of the media effect from corporate news events…Johnson
& Johnson’s highest ranking was number 10 out of 50 on the Flame Index. Johnson &
Johnson's rank is based on a real-time analysis of available media and information sources.
This results in a calculation of the companies most 'on fire' in public opinion. (Flame Index,
2012)
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The statement and ranking are two examples of how the media has described J&J’s recent
crises, but if the news coverage surrounding J&J’s crises is similar it could prove to be costly for the
company. Throughout the history of mass communication research, communication scholars have
differed in their thoughts regarding the degree that media affects the audience, but there is
consensus that the media does have effects on the audience (Baran & Davis, 2006). Considering the
effects that media has on audience perceptions, it is appropriate to examine media coverage
surrounding J&J’s product recalls and legal injunctions because of the suggested part that media
reports play in shaping the public’s perceptions.

Effects of media coverage on public perception

McQuail (1994) proposed that mass communication as a whole is grounded on the idea that
the media have significant effects. In general, media effects research examines the ways that media
messages influence the perceptions and behaviors of the public. McQuail also points out the fact
that the effects are determined just as much by the receiver as the sender. For example, framing
research suggests that receivers will be guided by frames in the news coverage and will also
internalize the frames and use them as they assign meaning to information and events (McQuail,
1994). Scheufele (1999) suggested that framing can be used to contextualize media effects
research.
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Framing.

Gamson and Modigliani (1987) suggest that a media frame is an idea or story line that offers
an interpretation of the meaning of events and the issues at hand. The media frame can include
intentional or unconscious acts by the sender. This suggests that media frames can be purposely
incorporated into media coverage by the message originator but they can also be included
subconsciously when the sender does not intend to include them.
Tankard (2001) suggests that there are three metaphors that aid the understanding of
framing metaphors. The first two metaphors relate framing to a picture frame. Firstly, Tankard
suggests that one purpose of a frame is to isolate a portion of a picture or painting and draw
attention to a certain part of it. Secondly, the picture frame can be used to influence the tone that
the picture is viewed with. For example, one might view a photograph differently depending on
how ornate or simplistic a frame is. These examples translate to the media’s ability to highlight
certain messages or ideas and their ability to set the tone for events and stories. Lastly, Tankard’s
final metaphor relates media framing to the frame of a house. In construction the frame is the basis
on which the rest of the structure is built. Similarly, the news frame is the idea upon which a story’s
organization is built.
Along the same lines, Entman (1993) claims, “To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described” (p.52). Additionally, individual frames involve the
internalization of ideas that individuals use to process information (Entman, 1993). While both
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Entman’s and Tankard’s media framing concepts focus on the selection of certain concepts or ideas
to share with the public, Entman’s perspective on media framing seems to place more emphasis on
the intent and motive of the person who is sending the message while Tankard focuses completely
on the medium. Entman also suggests that the receiver of the message plays an active role in the
process. Both Entman and Tankard’s ideas are important to this study because of the suggested
manner in which the news media’s coverage of organizations affects the public’s perception of
those organizations. In the case of J&J’s recalls, media framing research would suggest that media
coverage surrounding the recalls could impact: the public’s perceptions towards J&J, the amount of
responsibility for the crisis that the public places with J&J, whether or not the public views the
organization as guilty or innocent, and the perceived quality of the organization’s reputation.
Media framing research suggests that the valence of media coverage has the potential to
affect people’s perceptions of an organization in crisis. Additionally, the public’s perceptions of an
event or object can vary depending on whether or not the publicity is negative. Therefore, the
following research question is posed:
Research Question 1: Was there a difference in how the media evaluated Johnson &
Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the
current crises (November 2009 – April 2012)?
The tone of media coverage can be one indication of public perception due to its potential to
impact people’s perceptions. Thus answering this research question can provide insight for crisis
managers on how much attention should be directed towards media outlets and how much
credence should be given to the media reports.
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Publicity

Bond and Kirshenbaum (1998) suggest that the public generally associates more credibility
with publicity such as news reports than with communications that are controlled by companies.
Communication that is controlled by a company is referred to as controlled or paid media and
includes messages that organizations have direct control over such as advertising, commercials,
brochures, news releases and internal communication. On the contrary, uncontrolled media are
generated by external organizations such as television, print, radio, or online publications (Owen,
1991). When uncontrolled media report negative information, consumers weigh it more heavily
than positive news reports (Mizerski, 1982). Dennis and Merrill (1982) suggest that media prefer to
report negative content more than positive content. As organizations plan for future crises and
strategize for current crises, they must consider the pervasiveness of mass communication and the
potential of the media to cause irreparable damage to their reputations.

Reputation

Coombs and Holladay (2010), drawing upon work by Rindova and Fombrun (1999) and
Wartick (1992), describe reputation as “the aggregate evaluation constituents make about how well
an organization is meeting constituent expectations based on its past behaviors” (pp. 168-169).
Gray and Balmer (2002) suggest that an organization’s success is ultimately tied to maintaining a
good and recognizable corporate reputation.
21

A poor corporate reputation can make building a brand difficult; however a good reputation
does not always equal success. Consumers care most about the fairness that is shown to them by
the organization followed by the organization’s success, and the quality of the organization’s
leadership (Page & Fearn, 2005).
Cable and Turban (2006) conducted a study of job seekers and identified their perceptions
of the potential employers and examined how those perceptions affected their job searches. They
found that job seekers base assumptions of job attributes on reputation. Additionally, they found
that the manner in which job seekers’ perceived the organizational pride of employees is related to
their perceived reputation of the organization. Reputations let the public know how an
organization’s products, positions, and strategies compare to those of competing organizations
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).
Reputation is especially important during crises (e.g., recalls), when organizations attempt
to maintain their positive reputations in the face of potentially damaging information. It is more
important for organizations with an existing positive reputation to respond well to crises than for
companies who do not have good reputations. If negative publicity coincides with consumers’
attitudes and beliefs about an organization, then those pre-existing feelings combined with the
publicity will determine the actual impact to the organization’s brand and reputation (Pullig,
Netemeyer & Biswas, 2006). Thus, organizations such as J&J that have solid reputations and brand
images should have a greater ability to “weather” crisis storms.
Although organizations rely heavily on the media to get their messages out, they must also
be cognizant of the fact that the only way to totally control such messaging is through advertising.
With this in mind, one should consider how information is exchanged between the media and
organizations with unpaid media. Without the guarantee of placement that comes with advertising,
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organizations are left at the mercy of the media. The media have a choice whether or not to relay
the information that the organization is sharing and they also have the liberty to communicate their
ideas and opinions regardless of the reputation harm that may arise from the comments. Contrarily,
news media also rely on information generators such as public relations practitioners to supply
facts and other news content. In this way organizations act as information subsidies the media.
According to Gandy (1982) the exchange of information between the news media and organization
and mutually-beneficial relationship is described as:
An attempt {by the media} to produce influence over the actions of others by controlling
their access to and use of information relevant to those actions. The source {organization}
causes it to be made available at something less than the cost a user would face in the
absence of the subsidy. (p. 61)

Thus, the information subsidy includes news and facts that practitioners offer to help journalists
supplement their articles. Journalists find that it is cost effective to rely on organizations for
information because they were not required to spend time and effort to gather information, which
allows them to use their own resources less often and more strategically (Walters & Walters, 1992).
When unexpected issues arise within an organization, oftentimes the problems can be
resolved without them becoming a crisis. An organization must determine if an event is truly a
crisis based on factors such as effects on stakeholders, effects on the bottom line, and effects on
safety. The news media acts as an information gatekeeper by determining what information is
worthy of space in the outlet, and what the public will deem as newsworthy (Flower, Haynes, &
Crespin, 2003). Additionally, news media serve in a watchdog capacity to help keep the public
abreast of information that is deemed important. The news media have occupational parameters
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that allow them to make timely decisions about what news stories to cover. According to the
Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics:
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public enlightenment is the
forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to
further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of
events and issues. (Society of Professional Journalists, 2012)

An organization in crisis must use strategic communication to protect the valuable asset of
their reputation. But they also must provide the information the public needs to take action if they
are affected by the crisis. Research in the area of crisis communication provides insights into factors
that organizations should consider when evaluating a crisis and how the type of crisis should affect
its communication efforts.

Research in crisis communication

Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) offers systematic
guidance for organizations to follow as they develop responses to crises based on the type of crisis
that occurs. SCCT is grounded in attribution theory which suggests that people look for underlying
reasons that events occur because they seek to maintain a sense of control over their lives (Coombs,
1995; Dean, 2004). To take this a step further, the discounting principle suggests that a causal
inference will be discounted if a plausible explanation exists (Dean, 2004). For example, J&J is well
known and highly regarded for its crisis response to the Tylenol tampering in the 1980s. However,
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now that the government is intervening with this highly regarded company over the safety of its
products, the discounting principle suggests that consumers will divert from their pre-existing
perceptions of the company and hold it liable for the current safety issues. According to Coombs
and Holladay (1996), “The more publics attribute crisis responsibility to an organization, the
stronger the likelihood is of publics developing and acting upon negative images of the
organization.”
SCCT is based on the receivers’ perceptions of the crisis and on the amount of responsibility
that they attribute to the organization. Coombs and Holladay (2002) originally identified the
following crisis categories: natural disaster, rumors, workplace violence, product
tampering/malevolence, challenges, technical error accidents, technical error recalls, human error
accidents, human error recalls, and organizational misdeeds. They later reduced the categories into
three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable based on similar characteristics among the
original categories. The key differentiator in each category is the amount of control that the
organization has over the crisis. The results of Coombs and Holladay’s study also showed that the
amount of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization increased progressively from each
category, with the lowest responsibility attributed to the victim cluster and the highest
responsibility attributed to the preventable cluster. Here the control element is also directly tied to
the level of responsibility that individuals will attribute to the organization. The less control that
the organization had over the crisis, the less responsibility individuals will attribute to the
organization.
The victim cluster includes crises where the organization was a victim as well as
stakeholders and is not responsible for the crisis in any way. The accident cluster involves crises
that were unintentional on the part of the organization such as technical failure and mechanical
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breakdown leading to the creation of a defective product. The accident cluster crises are beyond the
control of the organization because the breakdown was unforeseen. The preventable cluster
involves organizations intentionally putting stakeholders at risk or acting inappropriately or
illegally. Additionally, crises that result from human error fall in this cluster because it is possible
that human error could have been prevented with proper training or other intervention.
According to these definitions, J&J’s original tampering of 1982 should be categorized in the
victim cluster because J&J was the victim of a tampering and was not at fault for what occurred. In
contrast, several of the J&J’s current recalls would be categorized in the preventable cluster because
J&J was found to be negligent. Additionally, J&J's apparent negligence and failure to comply with the
FDA standards appears to be well within the organization’s control, so the crisis would meet the
criteria for a preventable crisis according to SCCT. Therefore, the SCCT suggests that receivers
would have increased attribution of responsibility for J&J concerning the current crises compared
to the 1980s tampering.
According to the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), preventable crises have
the potential to damage an organization’s reputation more than victim or accident crises. Therefore
the following research question is posed:
Research Question 2: Was there a difference in the crisis type that the news media
described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012)?

The answer to this research question pertains to the basic premises of SCCT when
combined with the results of other research questions that address the evaluation of J&J’s
operational response and description of J&J as an organization. Although the results will not prove
causation they will be able to suggest possible relationships to study for future research.
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SCCT also suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on
patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Stability
refers to an event that occurs frequently and appears to be occurring in patterns, while instability is
when a crisis happens infrequently and considered to be a rare occurrence.
SCCT also proposes that individuals are more forgiving of unstable crises because the
organizations involved are not “repeat offenders,” in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more
harshly because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur.
Additionally, SCCT identifies categories that intensify the situation and further impact how
much responsibility the public will attribute to the organization for the crisis. Those categories are:
the severity of the crisis and the performance history of the organization (Coombs & Holladay,
2002). Severity is represented by the actual damage done by the crisis including financial damage,
environmental damage, and damage to human life. Performance history includes an organization’s
response during past crises, past actions of the organization, and how the organization has treated
stakeholders in the past. Coombs and Holladay (2002) suggest that “As severity increases or
performance history worsens publics will attribute greater crisis responsibility to the organization”
(p. 169).
The current J&J crises have not resulted in loss of life, however there have been major
implications economically for the organization and its stakeholders, which appear to be
compounding with each recall such as the plant closures causing major reduction in overall
production, decreased products in retail outlets, and significant judicial proceedings (Silverman,
2011; 24/7 Wall Street, 2010). It is also possible that J&J’s handling of the current recalls and
repeated mishandling of current crises could detract from the well established reputation of the
organization. Additionally, since media coverage of an organization’s history of previous crises can
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make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation, the following research question
is posed:
Research Question 3: Was there a difference in references to prior recalls in the news
coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November
2009 – April 2012)?
Identifying references to previous recalls could allow the researcher to posit certain relationships
between crisis history and attribution of responsibility when combined with the evaluative
variables that are addressed in Research Question 1.

Organizational response to crises

According to Coombs and Holladay (2002), “An organization’s communicative response to a
crisis can serve to limit and even to repair the reputational damage” (p. 166). There are numerous
scholarly sources that suggest the proper organizational response to crises, but Sturges (1994)
suggests that organizations employ three different crisis responses: instructing information,
adjusting information and internalizing information. Internalizing information is also referred to as
reputation management strategies and those strategies were refined as a part of SCCT. Instructing
information tells people how to protect themselves physically and financially during a crisis. It also
instructs the business community how to act regarding normal business operations. Adjusting
information helps people cope psychologically with the crisis and begins to explain what is being
done to rectify the situation and prevent it from recurring.
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Coombs (2012) suggests that instructing and adjusting information should be at the core of
any crisis response and that no reputation management concerns should be addressed before
providing these information-giving strategies. These types of information are important in the
direct aftermath of crises because people are in the information seeking stage and it is beneficial for
the organization to provide information regarding the crisis to reassure the public that the
organization is in control of the situation.
Instructing information must come first because it provides information to stakeholders
about how they can protect themselves physically & financially to prevent harm (Coombs, 2007;
Sturges, 1994). This information is especially important during health crises, product harm,
product recalls, natural disasters, and crises threatening public safety (Kim et al., 2011). Protection
is crucial to prevent reputational damage, so organizations must provide information that assures
stakeholders that the appropriate course of action is being taken to ensure protection and that the
organization knows what transpired and how to correct the problems. This provision of
information to stakeholders helps shape their perceptions and beliefs about the organization being
in control of the situation (Birch, 1994).
Adjusting information helps stakeholders cope with the psychological stress of the crisis
(Coombs, 2007; Sturges, 1994). Adjusting information also communicates the corrective actions
being implemented by the organization and the steps being taken to prevent a recurrence (Coombs,
2009). According to Holladay (2009) instructing and adjusting information share common goals:
The goals are to meet stakeholders’ needs to understand and cope with the crisis and to
demonstrate that the organization is actively involved in managing the crisis.
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Therefore the following research question is posed:
Research Question 4: Was there a difference between the media’s description of Johnson &
Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises
(November 2009 – April 2012)?
The results of this research question could prove to be useful to communication scholars when
combined with the crisis type variable to see if a certain information-giving strategy appears to be
used more often with a certain type of crisis.
In spite of the importance of the two information giving strategies, most of the current
communication literature focuses on reputation management rather than information-giving
strategies (Coombs, 2009; Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2011; Sturges, 1994). Reputation management
strategies are used to maintain an organization’s reputation by initiating the appropriate response
for the crisis at hand (Coombs, 2012). These strategies communicate information to stakeholders
that will be used to make judgments about organization’s image and reputation (Newsom & Carrell,
1986). These strategies should be selected based on the precepts of SCCT. Although communication
scholars have coined various names for reputation management strategies the basic concepts and
premises are similar (Benoit & Drew, 1997). The strategies can be generally grouped into four
categories of strategic responses: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce (Coombs, 2006). The four
categories represent a continuum ranging from strategies that are more defensive to those that are
more accommodating. They also have varying degrees of organizational acceptance of
responsibility for the crisis and also are geared to match the organization’s response to
stakeholders’ degree of blame that is associated with the organization experiencing the crisis.
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The following descriptions of the four categories were based on Benoit’s (1997) and
Coombs’ (2006) crisis communicative strategies typology. The deny category includes statements
that deny the occurrence or existence of the crisis or deny that the organization is the cause of the
crisis. The diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization
is somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are
inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held
responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s
ability to control the situation. The rebuild category includes statements that outline the corrective
actions being made to rectify the situation. Organizations may also accept responsibility for the
crisis in these statements and apologize for it. The statements may express willingness for
remediation, rectification, and proactive works. The organization may also explain how
organizational policies are changing in response to the crisis. The reinforce category includes
statements that try to shift attention from the crisis by reminding stakeholders of the organization’s
good track record by placing the crisis in a more desirable context. These statements may also
recognize stakeholders for their continued support and understanding during the crisis.
SCCT recommendations require organizations to match their crisis responses to features of
the crises in order to protect them from possible reputational damage. However, this framework
offers recommendations based on optimal matching principles designed to enhance the
effectiveness of the response. The actual response strategies that organizations employ during
crises may differ. Hence, there is a need to understand how organizations in crisis use reputation
management strategies.
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The four categories of strategic responses can be demonstrated through 14 specific
reputation management strategies. The reputation management strategy descriptions used in the
present research were based on a typology used by Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2006). The
following table outlines each of the strategies:
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Table 1 Reputation Management Strategies
Attack the

Confronts the person or group saying there is a crisis, claiming no crisis exists.

Diminish

Deny

Accuser
Denial
Scapegoat

Blames some person or group outside of the org for turning this into a crisis. Organization may
blame a vendor or supplier for crisis.

Suffering

Claims that organization is an unfair victim of crisis

Excuse

Minimizes the organization’s responsibility by denying intent to do harm to others, create a
poor product, or damage the environment

Deny Volition

Minimizes the organization’s responsibility by claiming inability to control the events that
triggered the crisis or by claiming that the situation was beyond the organization’s control

Justification

Rebuild

Compensation
Apology

Minimizes the perceived damage that was caused by the crisis (i.e., “It is not as bad as it seems”
or “It could have been worse”)

The organization offers money, compensation or other gifts to the victims of the crisis
Indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis

Repentance

Asks stakeholders and victims to forgive the organization for the crisis

Rectification

Says that the organization is taking corrective action to prevent future recurrence and to
remedy the current problem. Such corrective action could include, but is not limited to: changes
in manufacturing, procedural changes, policy changes, personnel training.

Bolstering

Reinforce

Asserts there is no crisis. There are two types of denial (absolute & reserved)

Reminds stakeholders of the organization’s past good works and praises actions taken in
response to the crisis. May also emphasize the organization’s positive attributes or positive
actions in the past

Transcendence

Places crisis in a larger, more desirable context. Suggests a different frame of reference. Admits
involvement in the crisis, but shows how the act advanced a greater common good

Ingratiation

Praises stakeholders by thanking them for their support. Thanks stakeholders and volunteers
for assisting the organization and continue to show loyalty during the crisis.
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These 14 reputation management strategies describe the common themes that
organizations experiencing crises may employ to help maintain their reputable status. The crisis
communicators choose which strategy is warranted based on the specific characteristics of the
crisis at hand. This examination of reputation management strategies will provide insight into the
extent to which SCCT’s tenets were evident in media reports of J&J’s formal responses. Therefore,
the following research question is posed:
Research Question 5: What reputation management strategies does the 1982 news
coverage and current news coverage report that Johnson & Johnson used?
Identifying the reputation management strategies that the media reported that J&J used in
1982 and the current crises could be helpful to scholars and practitioners. By providing insight into
the strategies that are reported in the news in connection with certain crisis types, scholars could
begin to posit relationships between the two. Practitioners could benefit from the results of this
research question by seeing an example of the reputation management strategies that were
reported in an exemplary crisis response as well as a less highly regarded one. The data could also
allow practitioners to weigh whether or not employing certain strategies could possibly be
detrimental to depictions of their organization’s reputation.

Significance of Research

Framing research suggests that media frames influence people’s interpretations of current
events by emphasizing certain elements while also downplaying others. This notion is extremely
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important to organizations that are experiencing crises because news coverage has a large impact
on the perception, management and evolution of a crisis (Ringo, 2005).
The literature on crisis communication demonstrates that the manner in which an
organization handles a past crisis affects the potential for reputational harm in future crises. More
specifically, this threat is more likely to arise in future crises resulting from intentional and
preventable acts on the organization’s part. From this research, it appears that attribution of
responsibility increases with the organization’s ability to prevent the crisis. Individuals are less
willing to forgive acts that are deemed as intentional or preventable. Organizations use crisis
response strategies to reduce reputation threats that arise from crises.
The data gathered from this systematic approach to analyzing newspaper coverage
surrounding Johnson & Johnson’s recalls will offer valuable insight to crisis managers. It will
expand the existing literature on recalls by providing an in-depth comparison of an exemplary
crisis management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis
where the organization seemed to falter in comparison. The analysis of media coverage of the crises
enables us to examine theoretically-based concepts and advice believed to be important for
effective crisis management. The present study will add to existing literature by exploring how the
newspaper coverage depicts organizations that are experiencing multiple and sustained crises over
extended periods of times.
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Summary

This chapter has reviewed the existing literature regarding media framing and crisis
communication as well as J&J’s past and present experience during a crisis. This study seeks to
describe media coverage surrounding J&J’s 1982 cyanide-laced Tylenol crises as well as the crises
that the organization has experienced between December 2009 and March 2012. Crisis
communication and media framing literature will inform the examination of the media content. The
following chapter discusses the research methodology that was used to address the research
questions.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS

Introduction

Chapter one provided the background, theoretical grounding, rationale and research
questions for this study. The present chapter describes the research method used to address the
research questions concerning crisis type, crisis history, tone, crisis response, and reputation
management strategies described in newspaper coverage.
This chapter also describes the coding instrument used to examine the newspaper coverage
and the testing of the coding instrument’s reliability. Newspaper coverage of J&J’s 1982 recall as
well as J&J’s recalls from November 2009 – April 2012 in New York Times and Chicago Tribune was
examined. New York Times was used because it is considered to be a prestige newspaper in the
United States. Chicago Tribune was used because the 1982 Tylenol tampering occurred in the
Chicago area.

Content analysis method

Content analysis is a quantitative research method aimed at summarizing key elements
rather than the minute details of a sample (Neuendorf, 2002). Additionally, content analyses allow
researchers to make valid inferences in the data’s context that can be replicated (Krippendorf,
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2004). The first content analysis was introduced in 1941 and scholars at that time focused on the
analysis of manifest data (Krippendorf, 2004). Manifest data is objective and does not require the
researcher to extrapolate ideas or themes; one example is simply counting words. However, as the
method has evolved and gained more acceptance, many communication scholars now recognize the
contribution of the researcher’s analysis of latent data as well. Latent data requires more subjective
judgment and cannot be measured directly, but can be represented by one or more indicators. This
distinction is especially important to ensure that the quantitative elements of the analysis are not
taken out of context and can be used to make inferences about the data that is being examined
(Riffe, Lacy & Ficco, 1998). The present study examined both manifest and latent data within news
coverage in New York Times and Chicago Tribune.
The content analysis method is also appropriate for research involving media framing
because it allows a methodical description of various news coverage. The unit of analysis for this
study was each newspaper article. Using the entire article for the content analysis was the best
approach to ensure the most accurate description of the newspaper coverage because the research
questions concern overarching descriptions of the crisis and Johnson & Johnson. Oftentimes, the
crisis, organizational response, or reputation management strategy is described throughout several
paragraphs. Therefore, if the unit of analysis focused on the paragraph, the researcher would run
the risk of not understanding the full context of the coverage and the description that is provided.
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Search strategy

New York Times is regarded as a prestige publication by numerous communication scholars
and holds accolades such as the most Pulitzer prizes won out of all news organizations, the greatest
reach among national opinion leaders, and an audience of nearly 5 million readers (New York
Times, 2012; Seibel & Smith 2009; DeCicco, 1988). Therefore the current study examined articles
from New York Times because it is widely held as an industry leader. Chicago Tribune was used
because this publication would likely have a heavy concentration of coverage surrounding the past
and current crisis since the 1982 tampering occurred in the Chicago area.
New York Times and Chicago Tribune coverage from the original J&J recall was analyzed
from September 1, 1982 through September 1, 1983. The date range for this article retrieval was
based on the date of the first media reports of the Tylenol tampering. New York Times articles were
compiled using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following
Boolean search: “Tylenol” AND “Johnson & Johnson”. This search process produced 89 newspaper
reports from New York Times. Chicago Tribune articles were identified using the same search terms
on the Chicago Tribune web site archival search. This search process produced 19 newspaper
reports from Chicago Tribune.
New York Times and Chicago Tribune coverage from December 1, 2009 through April 17,
2012 was also examined. The date range for the article retrieval was based on the beginning of the
series of recalls for J&J that started at the end of November 2009. New York Times articles were
identified using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following
Boolean search: "Johnson & Johnson" OR "DePuy Orthopaedics" OR "McNeil Consumer Healthcare"
OR "Tylenol" AND "recall". This search process produced 84 New York Times newspaper reports.
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Chicago Tribune articles were identified using the same search terms on the Chicago Tribune web
site archival search. The search process produced 32 Chicago Tribune newspaper reports.
The researcher applied inclusion and exclusion criteria to the 224 articles that were
identified during the searches to ensure relevance to the research questions posed. The researcher
excluded any articles related to J&J’s financial reports, or executive departures and appointments,
and duplicate articles. The final sample combined New York Times and Chicago Tribune articles and
consisted of 28 articles from the 1982 coverage and 41 articles from the current coverage, making a
total of 69 reports for analysis.

Coding scheme
The coding scheme pertained to variables identified in the research questions. The
researcher drew upon the work of Benoit (1997), Coombs (2006), and Sturges (1994) to develop a
coding scheme to examine the newspaper coverage. Appendix B reports the coding scheme.
The coding scheme provided instructions to record the publication date and author for each
article. The past recalls variable was recorded as “yes” or “no” based on whether or not the
coverage made a reference to past recalls from J&J or its subsidiaries. A list of J&J’s subsidiaries can
be found in Appendix C. There was also a question that was used only for the current (November
2009 – April 2012) sample regarding whether or not the coverage referred to the1982 Tylenol
tampering specifically. According to SSCT, media coverage of an organization’s history of previous
crises can make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation. Therefore this
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category was used to identify whether or not crisis history was referred to in the newspaper
coverage.

Crisis type variable

The coding scheme provided instructions to examine the news coverage to determine if a
specific crisis type was described. The identification was based on Coombs and Holladay’s (2002)
crisis type categorizations: victim, accident, and preventable. Media reports that described the
crisis as the victim type were identified by reviewing the coverage to see if J&J was called a victim, if
the coverage described a tampering, sabotage or workplace violence; or if responsibility was
attributed outside of the J&J family of companies. The accident frame was identified by any mention
of technical breakdown, mechanical failure, or undetectable problems. The preventable frame was
identified if the news coverage stated that J&J intentionally and knowingly put stakeholders at risk,
violated the law, or if human error was the cause and could have been prevented with more
thorough training. The coder also indicated if there was no reference to crisis type.
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Evaluation of J&J’s operational response variable

The way in which the media described J&J’s handling of recalls was identified by examining
the tone that the news coverage used to describe J&J’s operational response to the crisis.
Operational responses include: the corrective actions taken in response to the crisis (i.e.,
procedural changes, additional employee training; or instituting new quality control measures).
This category contained four possible types of tone: positive, negative, both positive and negative,
or neutral reference. The intent of this category was for the coder to identify the tone of the
descriptions of J&J’s actions in response to the recalls.
The positive reference was identified by any mention similar to J&J making necessary
improvements, ensuring that products were safe, crediting J&J with making sure that stakeholders
were aware of dangers, and J&J responding adequately and in a timely fashion. The negative
reference was identified if the news coverage described J&J’s response negatively, accused J&J of
poor response to the issue, described J&J’s actions as negligible, or criticized J&J’s response. The
both positive and negative reference was used when the news coverage provided both positive and
negative information regarding J&J’s operational handling and response to the recall. The neutral
reference was identified by coverage that objectively reported actions or details regarding what
measures J&J was taking to handle the recall and did not include an evaluation of the response. The
coder also indicated if there was no description of J&J’s operational response. All of the attributes
within the positive, negative, and both positive and negative categories that were listed in the
coding scheme did not have to be described in the news coverage for a category to be recorded.

42

Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable

The overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation category sought to describe the tone used in news
coverage to evaluated J&J as a company overall. The coding scheme provided examples of terms
that could possibly be found in the coverage and deemed as favorable or unfavorable. The coder
also indicated if the news coverage did not describe J&J’s reputation. The coding scheme instructed
the coder to identify which category was dominant in the article. The favorable tone was identified
by looking for terms of admiration, honor, validation, and praise in regards to J&J’s reputation. The
unfavorable tone was identified by news coverage that was critical of J&J, mentioned poor quality
control, or described the problem as a pattern of continued issues.
Information giving was identified based on any description of a formal organizational
response in the news coverage. For the purposes of this study, any reference to a formal response
to the crisis was assumed to have originated with the organization unless it was attributed to a
third party such as first responders, government officials or industry experts. The categories were
based on Sturges’ (1994) two categories of information giving which are instructing information
and adjusting information.

Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting
information variable

Instructing information was identified by information that outlined how people could
protect themselves physically and financially from the crisis. This strategy also could instruct the
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business community on whether employees should report to work or how business operations
were being affected. The adjusting information strategy was identified in the news coverage by
information that was geared toward helping people cope psychologically with the crisis and explain
what was being done to prevent a recurrence.

Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable

The reputation management strategy category enabled the coder to identify whether or not
the news coverage described a reputation management strategy that J&J used. The coding scheme
instructed the coder to consider the macro-level categories of strategic responses to help narrow
down what reputation management strategies were being described if any. The macro-level
strategic response categories were: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce. These categories were
not recorded, but were used as a guide to help the coder identify any micro-level reputation
management strategies. Then the coding scheme provided instructions to record which of the 14
reputation management strategies were used. The strategy descriptions were based on Coombs’
(2012) typology. The coding scheme gave instructions to record the most dominant strategy first
followed by the other strategies in descending order of dominance because multiple reputation
management strategies might have been present in an article. The coder also indicated if no
reputation management strategy was presented in the article.
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Intercoder reliability

In order to assess the reliability of the coding scheme, two coders were used to establish the
coding reliability prior to coding the actual data set. The researcher conducted a training session
with two coders to explain and demonstrate use of the coding scheme. The coders were blind to the
specific research questions guiding the investigation. They were given a sample of crisis news
reports unrelated to J&J to code to test their understanding of and ability to use the coding scheme.
After the initial coding, the researcher and coders discussed discrepancies in coding and identified
ways to refine the instrument. The researcher made minor adjustments to the coding scheme based
on the coders’ recommendations. After the coding scheme was modified, the coders examined a
subset of J&J news coverage from The Washington Post and USA Today to validate the coding
scheme.
The coders recorded data on a spreadsheet created by the researcher. Both coders reviewed
a sub-sample of 20 articles from publications other than New York Times and Chicago Tribune,
which represented nearly 30% of the total number of articles in the actual sample. Each coder’s
responses were compared to ensure that the data was recorded in the same order. The intercoder
reliabilities for each variable were computed using Cohen’s kappa coefficient. The assessment of the
level of agreement was based on Landis’ and Koch’s (1977) agreement classifications: 0 - .20 =
slight agreement, .21 – .40 = fair agreement, .41 – .60 = moderate agreement, .61 – .80 = substantial
agreement, and .81 – 1.00 = almost perfect agreement. Table 2 reports the coding reliabilities and
the interpretations of the reliability coefficients. It should be noted that the results of the reputation
management strategy variables were collapsed into the four primary strategic response categories
to see if the reliability of the first, second and third most dominant reputation management strategy
variables would improve.
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Table 2 Intercoder Reliability
Variable

Cohen’s Kappa

Agreement

Mention of the 1982 recall

Undefined

n/a

Mention of previous recalls

.588

Moderate

Crisis type

.209

Slight

Evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis

.222

Fair

Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation

.905

Almost Perfect

Crisis response – instructing information

.604

Moderate

Crisis response – adjusting information

.339

Fair

Most dominant strategic response category

.411

Moderate

2nd most dominant strategic response category

.260

Fair

3rd most dominant strategic response category

-.0219

No

Most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy

.486

Moderate

2nd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy

.196

Slight

3rd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy

-.0219

No
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Although Cohen’s kappa for mention of the 1982 recall was undefined, it should be noted
that the coders had 100% agreement, which is the likely explanation for the undefined kappa. The
relatively low coding reliabilities could have resulted from the coders’ examination of latent content
rather than manifest content. As previously discussed, latent content requires the coder to make
more subjective interpretations of the data. Lower than expected intercoder reliabilities may have
resulted from the difficulty of the coding tasks (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).
Due to the difficulty that was encountered in establishing the reliability of the coding
scheme and the complexity of the coding tasks, the final coding decisions were made by the
researcher. The researcher’s familiarity with the J&J cases and concepts represented in the coding
scheme was considered when the decision was made to allow the researcher to code the actual data
set. The final data set consisted of a total of 69 newspaper articles, 28 from 1982 and 41 from
November 2009 – April 2012. Each newspaper article was analyzed using the coding scheme.

Summary

This chapter described the research method employed for this study, described the way the
sample was collected, outlined the operational definitions used to examine the newspaper
coverage, and described the coding scheme and coding process. Chapter three presents the results
of the statistical analyses that were used to address the research questions.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
Chapter two explained the methods used to gather the data, described the coding scheme
and explained the coding process that was used to describe the news coverage. This chapter
presents the results of the analyses used to examine the research questions. Frequencies for each
variable were computed to observe the data distributions.

Test of Research Questions

Evaluation of J&J’s operational response variable
Research Question 1 inquired if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson
& Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the current
crises (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 1, the frequencies for two
variables were compared for the 1982 media reports and the current media reports: how the news
articles evaluated J&J’s operational response to the crisis and how the news coverage evaluated
J&J’s overall reputation.
First, the evaluation of J&J’s response referred to how the news coverage described J&J’s
operational/physical response to the crisis. It could be categorized as positive, negative, both
positive and negative, or no evaluation. The distribution for this variable is shown in Figure 1. Of
the 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage, the evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis were
described as follows: 3.6% (n=1) positive; 0% negative; 0% both positive and negative; and 96.4%
(n=27) no evaluation. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 4.9%
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(n=2) described a positive response; 24.4% (n=10) described a negative response; 0% described
both a positive and negative response; and 70.7% (n=29) did not evaluate J&J’s response. A visual
inspection of the data distributions suggests that majority of the stories in both samples contained
no evaluations of J&J’s operational response. The number of occurrences in the “both” category
were negligible.
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Both

No
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Figure 1 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Operational Response
Although a crosstabs analysis is appropriate for nominal data, the low number of
occurrences for most categories presented a challenge for statistical analysis. With this
consideration, the chi-square statistic was not a suitable measure to use with this variable.
The proportions of actual occurrences in each sample were computed where the “no
evaluation” was excluded. The 1982 sample contained 100% (n=1) positive evaluation compared to
16.7% (n=2) positive evaluations and 83.3% (n=10) negative evaluations in the current sample.
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The frequencies suggest that when the current news coverage did evaluate J&J’s operational
response it was overwhelmingly negative.

Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable

The second variable that was used to examine Research Question 1 was the overall
evaluation of J&J’s reputation which referred to how the news coverage described J&J as an
organization. The coverage could be identified as favorable, unfavorable or no mention. The
distribution is shown in Figure 2. Of 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage the overall evaluation
of J&J’s reputation was categorized as follows: 3.5% (n=1) favorable; 3.5% (n=1) unfavorable; and
93% (n=26) no mention. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 0%
described J&J’s reputation favorably; 17% (n=7) described J&J’s reputation unfavorably; and 83%
(n=34) did not mention J&J’s reputation.
A visual inspection of the data showed that majority of the news coverage in both samples
did not provide an overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation. Therefore, the “no evaluation” category
was dropped to permit an examination of only those instances where evaluations were provided.
Frequencies were inspected after dropping the low frequency category. Of the 1982 news coverage,
50% (n=1) described J&J’s reputation favorably and 50% (n=1) described it unfavorably. In
comparison, 100% (n=7) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J’s reputation
unfavorably. The data distribution for this variable showed that the media coverage in both
samples tended not to evaluate J&J’s overall reputation. Therefore, a cross tabs analysis is
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unsuitable for this variable due to the low occurrences of favorable and unfavorable responses.
However, a visual inspection of the frequency distributions for the data reveals that when an
evaluation appeared in the 1982 sample, there was an even balance of favorable and unfavorable
descriptions. In contrast, in the current sample, all of the evaluations that did occur were
unfavorable.
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No Mention

Figure 2 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Overall Reputation

Crisis type variable

Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in the crisis type that the news media
described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012). To
address Research Question 2, the frequencies for the crisis type variable were compared. Crisis type
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referred to whether the news coverage described the crisis as a victim crisis, accident crisis,
preventable crisis, or if no crisis type was described. The distribution for the crisis type variable is
shown in Figure 3.
Of 28 articles from the 1982 sample there were 35.7% (n=10) victim; 0% accident; 0%
preventable; and 64.3% (n=18) no crisis type. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November
2009 – April 2012, 0% described a victim crisis; 24% (n=10) described an accident crisis; 22%
(n=9) described a preventable crisis; and 54% (n=22) did not describe a crisis type. The no crisis
type category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when a crisis type was
mentioned in 1982, 100% (n=10) of the articles described the victim crisis type. In contrast, when a
crisis type was mentioned in the current sample, 52.6% (n=10) of the mentions were described as
accident crises and 47.4% (n=9) were described as a preventable crisis. The data distributions
showed that the media coverage in both samples tended to not identify the recall as a specific crisis
type. However when a crisis type was described, the 1982 sample described a victim crisis in all
instances, while the current coverage only described the crisis as accident or preventable.
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Figure 3 Crisis Type
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the descriptions of crisis types from the
samples. The analysis indicated that there was a significant difference in the media coverage of the
Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 data and the current data, χ2(3)=27.943, p<.001, V=.636. The
statistical significance and a large effect size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the two
samples was meaningful. However, these results are not reliable due to three cells having expected
counts less than five.
Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the
news coverage of the Johnson & Johnson 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November
2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 3, the frequencies for two variables were used:
1) the mention of a previous recall and 2) the mention of the 1982 recall in the current sample only.
The mention of a previous recall variable referred to whether or not the news coverage referred to
a prior recall that occurred in the current timeframe and could be answered either yes or no. Of 28
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articles from the 1982 news coverage, none referred to a previous recall. In contrast, the current
sample contained had 19.5% (n=8) articles that did not refer to a previous recall and 80.5% (n=33)
that did refer to a previous recall that occurred in the current timeframe. The examination of
frequencies demonstrated that there were no references to a previous recall in 1982. The lack of
publicity of large scale recalls in 1982 is a possible explanation for the lack of mentions of previous
recalls. However, the large number of recalls that occurred in the current time frame is perhaps the
reason that the current sample mentioned previous recalls more often. The distributions are shown
in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 References to a Previous Recall within the Current Timeframe of the Article
J&J’s management of the 1982 recall has often been regarded as exemplary; therefore the
current data set was also examined for mentions of the 1982 recall specifically. Media coverage
from the current data set was used to examine how often the news coverage referred to the 1982
recall specifically. According to the current data set, 7.3% (n=3) referred to the 1982 recall and
92.7% (n=38) of the articles did not mention the 1982 recall. No statistical analyses were
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performed for Research Question 3 regarding mentions of previous recalls or mentions of the 1982
recall in the current sample due to the fact that no articles from the 1982 sample mentioned a
previous recall and because of the large number of current articles that did not refer to the 1982
recall.

Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting
information variable

Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between the media’s reports of
Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises
(November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 4, the frequencies for reports of
instructing information and adjusting information were examined separately. Instructing
information was identified by formal responses from J&J that helped people cope physically and
financially with the crisis. The distributions for instructing information are shown in Figure 5. Of
the 28 articles from 1982, 32.1% (n=9) provided instructing information while 67.9% (n=19) did
not. In comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 51.2% (n=21) provided instructing
information and 48.8% (n=20) did not.
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Figure 5 Inclusion of Instructing Information
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the inclusion of instructing information
reported in the 1982 sample and the current sample. The crosstabs analysis indicated that there
was not a significant difference in the inclusion of instructing information in the 1982 data and the
current data, χ2(1)=2.464, p=.143 , Ф= .189. The effect size was small (Cohen, 1988). These results
indicate the difference between the two samples was not meaningful.
The second variable used to answer Research Question 4 was adjusting information which
referred to information that was designed to help people cope psychologically with the crisis. The
distributions for adjusting information are shown in Figure 6. Of the 28 articles from 1982, 60.7%
(n=17) provided adjusting information while 39.3% (n=11) did not. In comparison, of the 41
articles from the current sample, 61% (n=25) provided adjusting information and 39% (n=16) did
not.
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A visual examination of the data shows there should be no difference between the inclusion
of adjusting information in both samples. The crosstabs analysis confirmed that there was not a
significant difference in the media inclusions of adjusting information for the 1982 data and the
current data, χ2(1)=.000, p=1.000 , Ф= .0003. The lack of statistical significance and the small effect
size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the samples was not meaningful.
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Figure 6 Inclusion of Adjusting Information
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Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable

Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategy (or strategies) was
reported in the 1982 and current news coverage. To be included in the reputation management
category, the strategy described had to be directly attributed to J&J versus a third party like the
FDA. To address Research Question 5, the frequencies for the reputation management strategy
variable were used. The 1982 sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation
management strategy used by J&J compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not
describe a reputation management strategy.
Although the coder was instructed to list the most dominant reputation management
strategy followed by the 2nd most dominant and third most dominant, those responses were all
combined for the analysis because it was more important to identify any reputation management
strategies that were used regardless of dominance. Thus, excluding the articles that did not mention
a reputation management strategy that was used, the frequencies were computed based on the
total number of times that the coder recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the
total number of articles in each sample. The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18
and there were 48 for the current sample.
The 1982 news coverage reflected the following frequencies of the reputation management
strategy category: 0% attack the accuser, 0% denial, 0% scapegoat, 28% (n=5) suffering, 0%
excuse, 0% deny volition, 6% (n=1) justification, 39% (n=7) compensation, 0% apology, 6% (n=1)
repentance, 22% (n=4) rectification, 0% bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. The
current news coverage had the following number of mentions: 0% attack the accuser, 10.4% (n=5)
denial, 6.3% (n=3) scapegoat, 0% suffering, 6.3% (n=3) excuse, 0% deny volition, 27.1% (n=13)
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justification, 12.5% (n=6) compensation, 6.3% (n=3) apology, 0% repentance, 25% (n=12)
rectification, 6.3% (n=3) bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. A visual examination
of the data indicated that several categories within the variable were not present in either sample
and in most instances there was not a reputation management strategy described. The combined
frequencies for this variable are displayed in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 Reputation Management Strategies Combined
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Due to the small frequencies for most of the categories within the 14 micro-level reputation
management strategies, the reputation management strategies were collapsed into the four macrolevel strategic response categories for further analysis. The macro-level strategic response
categories were deny, diminish, rebuild, reinforce, and no mention. The attack the accuser, denial,
scapegoat, and suffering strategies were combined into the deny category. The excuse, deny
volition, and justification strategies were combined into the diminish category. The compensation,
apology, repentance, and rectification strategies were combined into the rebuild category. The
bolstering, transcendence, and ingratiation strategies were combined into the reinforce category.
The no mention category was used for news coverage that did not provide a description. The 1982
sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation management strategy used by J&J
compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not describe a reputation management
strategy
These frequencies were also computed based on the total number of times that the coder
recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the total number of articles in each sample.
The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18 and there were 48 for the current
sample. When all instances of the strategic response categories were combined, without
consideration for dominance, the 1982 sample contained the following: 27.8% (n=5) deny, 5.6%
(n=1) diminish, 66.7% (n=12) rebuild, and 0% reinforce. The current sample had: 17% (n=8) deny,
33% (n=16) diminish, 43.8% (n=21) rebuild, and 6.3% (n=3) reinforce. The distribution is shown in
Figure 8.
A visual examination of the data shows that majority of the articles in both samples did not
describe a strategic response category that was employed by J&J. One point of interest is that only
1.2% of the 1982 coverage described the diminish category. In comparison, the current sample
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described the diminish category in 13% of the articles. A point of interest may also lie in the fact
that when the news coverage did describe a strategic response category, both the 1982 and current
sample used the rebuild strategy the most.

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Deny

Diminish
1982 Coverage

Rebuild

Reinforce

Current Coverage

Figure 8 Strategic Response Categories Combined

Summary

This section described the frequencies that were computed for each variable. A complete
list of the data frequencies appears in Appendix D. Research Question 1 asked if there was a
difference between the way that the news coverage described J&J’s handling of the response in the
1982 coverage and the current coverage. Research Question 1 did not include a statistical analysis
due to the large number of articles that did not provide an evaluation. However, when considering
the articles that did provide evaluations, the frequency distributions did indicate that the 1982
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sample contained 100% (n=1) positive evaluation compared to 16.7% (n=2) positive evaluations
and 83.3% (n=10) negative evaluations in the current sample.
In addition, the second variable used to answer Research Question 1 indicated that of the
1982 news coverage, 50% (n=1) described J&J’s reputation favorably and 50% (n=1) described it
unfavorably. In comparison, 100% (n=7) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J’s
reputation unfavorably.
The answer to Research Question 2 was that there was a very meaningful difference in how
the news media described the Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 sample and the current sample.
However, the reliability of the statistical significance was questionable due to the number of cells
with expected counts less than five. The frequency distributions suggested that the no crisis type
category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when crisis type was mentioned, it
was always described as a victim crisis in the 1982 sample and either described as an accident or
preventable crisis in the current sample.
No statistical analyses were performed for Research Question 3 that asked if there was a
difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall
and the current recall coverage (November 2009 – April 2012) due to the fact that none of the 1982
articles mentioned a previous recall. Thus a crosstabs analysis was not conducted to compare it to
the current sample. However, the frequency distribution did show that 80% of the current sample
referred to a previous recall. The second variable used to answer Research Question 3, was
regarding mentions of the 1982 recall in the current sample. The frequency distribution showed
that more than 90% of the current news coverage did not mention the 1982 recall specifically.
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The answer to Research Question 4 was that there was not a meaningful difference between
the news coverage’s description of Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting
information in the 1982 sample or the current recall. The frequency distributions showed that
32.1% of the 1982 sample described instructing information while 51.2% of the current sample
described it. The frequency distributions showed that there was not a large difference between the
inclusion of instructing or adjusting information in the samples, and the indication was confirmed
by the crosstabs analyses. The frequency distributions for adjusting information showed that
60.7% (n=17) of the 1982 sample provided adjusting information while 39.3% (n=11) did not. In
comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 61% (n=25) provided adjusting information
and 39% (n=16) did not.
Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategies were included in the
media coverage. The 1982 news coverage showed that J&J used the deny, diminish and rebuild
strategic responses. The current news coverage reported that J&J used the deny, diminish,
reinforce, and rebuild strategic responses. Both samples indicated that the media reported the
rebuild strategy most often.
This chapter described the results of the analyses performed to answer the research
questions. The next chapter will provide an interpretation of the results and a discussion of the
study’s strengths and limitations. In addition, the chapter will discuss directions for future research
and practical and theoretical implications of the work.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The previous chapter presented the results of the analyses employed to answer the
research questions. This chapter provides a discussion of the results and addresses some of the
study’s limitations. Theoretical and practical implications of the present study are presented and
directions for future research are offered.
The purpose of this study was to examine news coverage from the 1982 J&J Tylenol recall
and compare it to current news coverage of J&J’s recalls to understand how media coverage of the
recalls may have differed. The study used J&J as a case study to see if news coverage surrounding
each crisis supported the central claims of media framing research, crisis communication research,
and reputation management research. Previous research suggests the 1982 Tylenol recall would be
defined as a victim crisis whereas the current series of recalls would be classified as either accident
or preventable crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). The 1982 product tampering crisis resulted in
several deaths. However, the current recalls have not resulted in a loss of life or any serious bodily
harm. Nevertheless, J&J’s poor responses to the current recalls have forced the FDA to intervene
and seize control of operations in several of J&J’s plants.
J&J’s superb crisis management during the 1982 Tylenol recall garnered extensive
recognition and has become an exemplary case from which other organizations can learn. As J&J
has faced less severe crises than the 1982 recall since November 2009, the organization seems to be
failing to uphold the precedent that was set nearly 30 years ago. This stark contrast is surprising to
those who are familiar with both cases. Comparisons can be made between how the 1982 coverage
described the 1982 recall and how the current coverage described J&J’s current crises. The content
analysis method is an appropriate tool for this examination.
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The media determine what is newsworthy and decide how to frame the information they
present about the organization and the crisis. Organizations like J&J can provide information to
journalists in an effort to provide clarity to the situation and to minimize reputational damage
during crises like the recalls. However, the media are not required to use the information and they
ultimately decide what information is shared with the public via the news coverage. Thus, the
media coverage is selective and may not include all information provided by J&J.
Information that is relayed in news coverage may have significant impacts on public
perceptions and attitudes. Media framing research suggests that people’s perceptions are
influenced by news coverage. In addition, communication research suggests that news coverage is
more likely to be negative than positive. Organizations should be concerned about media
representations because of the potential that news coverage has to affect the way people view
issues and events. The current systematic analysis of media coverage of J&J’s recall crises
contributes to our understanding of the specific contents of media coverage, including what is
reported as well as evaluations of the organization that is being reported about.
The content categories used to examine the research questions and compare the 1982 recall
and the current recalls were developed based on media framing research, tenets of the Coombs’
(1995) SCCT, and Sturges’ (1994) information giving strategies, and were as follows: mention of
1982 recalls, mention of previous recalls, crisis type, evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis,
overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, inclusion of instructing information, inclusion of adjusting
information, and description of reputation management strategies.
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These categories were selected based on their relevance to the public’s understanding of
the recalls and their potential evaluation of J&J and its actions. Although the present study did not
focus on the public perspective and resulting behaviors, the descriptions can offer insights into
possible impacts of news coverage. More importantly, the results hold implications for
organizations seeking to recover from negative events such as crises.

Significance of the Results
Research Question 1 asked if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson &
Johnson’s handling of the crisis in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). A
comparison of the frequency distributions of the samples did show that 96.4% of the 1982 sample
and 70.7% of the current articles did not evaluate J&J’s operational response. However, when
considering only instances where evaluations of J&J’s operational responses were offered, the
media was more likely to provide positive evaluations of the 1982 recall.
According to SCCT, the 1982 crisis would be categorized as a victim crisis, while the current
recalls would be defined as accident or preventable crises, which was illustrated through the crisis
type variable (RQ2). A central idea underlying SCCT suggests that more responsibility is attributed
to the organization during accident and preventable crises than in victim crises. There was a small
number of occurrences in the samples: 1982 sample: (n=1) positive and current sample (n=2)
positive and (n=10) negative evaluations. However, the negative evaluations of the current crises
support the basic idea of SCCT regarding attribution of responsibility and crisis type. In contrast, in
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the 1982 recall J&J was the victim of product tampering and J&J’s operational response was
described in a positive light, which also is consistent with assumptions underlying SCCT.
The fact that there was such a small number of evaluations possibly suggests that although
the news coverage describes a crisis type with high attributions of responsibility, it does not
guarantee that the same article will also describe the organization’s operational response
negatively.
A second variable, overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, also was used to address Research
Question 1. No statistical analyses were conducted due to the low occurrence of reputational
evaluations. However, this is also an important finding for the overall reputation variable. The data
indicates that the media coverage rarely included reputational evaluations. In 93% and 83% of the
articles, respectively, journalists did not offer an assessment of J&J’s reputation. When this finding
is considered with the crisis type variable (RQ2), it suggests that journalists may be reluctant to
offer blatant evaluations of organizations in spite of the type of crisis that is being reported on.
Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in how the news media described the
Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 and the current recalls (November 2009 – April 2012). The
analysis focused on the crisis type variable. As was the case with the overall reputation variable, the
frequencies indicated that most articles did not identify a crisis type. However, when considering
only those articles where a crisis type was identified, all 10 of the articles in the 1982 sample
described the crisis as a victim crisis while 52.6% (n=10) of the current sample described it as an
accident crisis and 47.4% (n=9) described it as a preventable crisis. These results confirm the
expectation that the 1982 recall would be described differently than the current recalls based on
Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations. This confirmation is valuable because it can also help
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support the results for other research questions that suggest different categorizations of the crises
may have an impact on other descriptions and evaluations within the news coverage.
Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the
news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recalls. The 1982 sample did not
include any references to a previous recall. In contrast, about 80% of the current sample referred to
previous recalls. One possible explanation for the absence of references to recalls in the 1982
sample was that J&J may not have experienced any noteworthy recalls prior to the Tylenol
tampering. Another explanation for the 1982 coverage not referring to previous recalls is that since
the 1982 tampering involved deaths, perhaps the journalists were careful to not include
information on less significant events while reporting on deaths.
SCCT suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on
patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). An event that
occurs frequently and appears to be happening in patterns refers to a stable event while an event
that happens rarely is referred to as an unstable event. Additionally SCCT suggests that individuals
are more forgiving of unstable crises in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more harshly
because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur. Therefore,
one would assume that news coverage that mentions previous recalls would also likely be more
negative than coverage that did not.
The fact that the majority of the current sample referred to a previous recall could support
the SCCT concept of crisis history when consideration is also given to the depiction and evaluation
of J&J in that news coverage. Findings from Research Question 1 illustrated that when an evaluation
was included, the current news coverage was more negative in its evaluation of J&J’s operational
response. All of the occurrences of an evaluation of J&J’s reputation were unfavorable in the current
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sample also. The fact that most of the current articles mentioned a previous recall and were also
critical of J&J supports the crisis history idea that more attribution of responsibility is associated
with stable events.
While the present results cannot reveal a causal relationship between references to past
recalls and the evaluation of the organization in crisis, they do suggest that there was a difference in
the news coverage surrounding the 1982 recall and the current crises. The present data showed
that J&J’s 1982 crisis would likely be described as a victim crisis, which absolves the organization of
all responsibility. Therefore, one could assume that news coverage would also be less likely to
mention previous problems if any existed. The data described the current crises as either accident
or preventable crises according to Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations, therefore one would
expect the coverage to attribute more responsibility to J&J based on the concepts of SCCT. With this
consideration, one could also assume that the coverage may be more likely to mention past recalls
in the current coverage to show a pattern. The fact that there was a difference in the frequencies of
previous recalls between the two samples could possibly support this assumption. Another possible
consideration to support the SCCT crisis history concept is that J&J’s previous management may
have set high standards for the way that J&J would respond to crises. Therefore, current journalists
may be less forgiving of J&J’s current recall woes and view them more egregiously due to the
positive history established by J&J’s efforts in 1982.
The current sample was also examined for references to the 1982 recall specifically. The
frequency distribution showed that there were no mentions of the 1982 recall in the current
coverage. The reason to identify such mentions was to see if a reference to J&J’s handling of the
1982 recall, which was likely to be positive, would contrast with a negative tone in the current
news coverage, since the current recalls were accident and preventable crises. About 97% of the
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current articles did not mention the 1982 recall. This was surprising because of the widespread
attention received by the crisis during the time it occurred and the use of the 1982 case as an
exemplary model of crisis communication efforts.
One possible explanation for this result is that communication scholars may be more aware
of J&J’s highly-regarded response to the 1982 crisis because of its status as a role model of effective
communication in communication literature. Another possible explanation is that journalists may
not view the 1982 recall as relevant to the current recalls since the 1982 recall was categorized as a
victim crisis with deaths associated with it whereas the current recalls are seen as accident or
preventable crises. It is possible that the journalists would consider it crass to compare or contrast
the two. This data also suggests that crisis type may influence how journalists elect to frame a crisis.
An alternative explanation is that journalists may assume that most people know about the original
tampering case and therefore it is not necessary for them to mention it in the article. Since nearly
30 years have passed since the 1982 tampering, there is also the possibility that the journalists are
unfamiliar with the case and therefore exclude it.
Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between Johnson & Johnson’s use of
instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April
2012). Instructing and adjusting information are two information-giving strategies that are viewed
as central to crisis communication. The results indicated that there was no difference in J&J’s use of
instructing or adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises. In addition, both samples
included adjusting information more often than instructing information. These results were not
surprising since Sturges (1994) and Coombs (2012) both suggest that it is important to provide
both instructing and adjusting information during crises of any type.
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Coombs (2006) also suggests that different types of crises warrant different reputation
management strategies. A basic idea underlying SCCT is that crisis management strategies should
be matched to crisis type. Based on that idea, Research Question 5 asks which reputation
management strategies the news coverage reported that J&J used in the 1982 sample and the
current sample. The results showed that the media reported that J&J used deny, diminish, and
rebuild strategic response categories in the 1982 news coverage. The results indicated that the
deny, diminish, reinforce and rebuild strategic response categories were reported in the current
news coverage. The largest difference between the samples appeared in the diminish category. The
diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization is
somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are
inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held
responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s
ability to control the situation. In the 1982 sample, 1.2% of the articles contained diminish
responses compared to 13% in the current sample. This is not surprising due to the nature of each
recall crisis. It has been previously established that the 1982 recall was categorized as a victim
crisis, which would lessen the need for J&J to use the diminish response since no responsibility was
attributed to the organization.
The data also suggests that the same three types of reputation management strategies were
used most often in both samples in spite of each sample describing the recalls as different types of
crises. One possible explanation for the same reputation management strategies being used despite
the varying crisis types is that the organization’s culture may encourage certain types of responses
more than others. This would not be surprising in organizations like J&J that have longstanding and
established cultures and procedures that support the use of particular reputation management
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strategies. It also is possible that the journalists only included certain types of responses that came
from J&J directly.

Research Limitations

Although the content analysis method was most appropriate for this study because the
research focused on how media frames could convey information to the public, it also presented a
challenge for developing and validating the coding scheme. It is likely that the variable reliabilities
would have been enhanced if coders were not required to analyze latent data using a complex
coding scheme. However, much media framing research does require the analysis of latent data
rather than manifest content. It would have been difficult to identify certain variables like overall
evaluation of J&J and the evaluation of J&J’s reputation by using only manifest content data because
such data would not have allowed coders to rely on nuances to signal those descriptions either.
Because perceptions are central to conceptualizations of the media framing process, it is logical that
coders would need to rely on inferences in identifying ideas.
Some of the variables, namely the reputation management strategy, posed a coding
challenge for the study. The sub-categories within this variable required the coder to choose
between many strategies based on only a few sentences. The complexity of this task led to the
decision to collapse the data into the four categories of deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce.
Although this limited the exploration of the subcategories, it probably increased the accuracy of the
coding by reducing coding errors that could result from the need to make fine-grained distinctions.
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The sample size and the associated frequency distributions of variables also posed
limitations to this research. There were only 69 articles in the analysis, 28 articles from the 1982
sample and 41 from the current sample. The only possible way to increase the size would have been
to include a wider variety of media publications such as other prestige publications that would be
likely to cover the recalls. If there was more time and resources, the study may have also been
strengthened by using cluster samples to describe the coverage from various regions throughout
the U.S.
Another limitation of this research was its reliance on traditional media outlets. Specifically,
the sample did not include social media outlets that could report on the current crises. The
inclusion of information provided through various social media outlets could have produced a very
different data set by possibly evaluating J&J in a different light and reporting different types of
information that may not have appeared in the traditional newspaper format.
Lastly, the current study provides descriptions of news coverage. Thus it is sender-focused
because it investigates messages that were generated by journalists. While media framing research
suggests that the media strongly impacts public perception, the present study cannot describe
public perceptions because it did not evaluate the actual perceptions of people who read the news
coverage that was analyzed.
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Theoretical and Practical Implications

The results of this study contribute to scholarly literature by further supporting the basic
premises of SCCT using J&J’s 1982 crisis and current crises as case studies. The data supported the
possible relationship between attribution of responsibility and crisis type by showing that
evaluations of J&J were more critical regarding the preventable and accident crises than the victim
crisis. Additionally, the data supported the SCCT idea of performance history by showing that the
news coverage that did mention a previous recall had more negative evaluations and depictions
than the coverage that did not mention a previous recall.
The current sample also illustrated that the news coverage contained instructing and
adjusting information more often than it described a reputation management strategy. This could
suggest that the journalists are more concerned with communicating pertinent information to help
people cope and know how to behave during a crisis than with serving the organization’s interest
that might be addressed through conveying a reputation management strategy used by J&J. It is also
noteworthy that 61% of the coverage did not describe a reputation management strategy, which
might suggest that the journalists were more apt to include less biased information from third
parties like the FDA who are likely to be seen as representing the interests of the public.
The present study has also presented data surrounding what could be considered an
extended crisis with the current data set from November 2009 – April 2012. Variables such as the
evaluation of J&J’s operational response, the description of J&J’s reputation, and the use of
reputation management strategies could be examined with consideration to the time that the recall
occurred to see if there was a point in the coverage where the depictions may have changed.
Although many crises are rather short-term events, like the 1982 recall, some crises like the current
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J&J recalls and the BP oil spill are noteworthy for the extended time in which they are in the media
spotlight. Future studies should consider extended crises with consideration for time, to possibly
suggest a turning point in the news coverage of events. Also, theories and research methods should
be developed to more comprehensively investigate these extended crises.
The data gathered from this study surrounding J&J’s recalls will also offer valuable insight
to crisis managers who must respond to these exigencies. The present research expands the
existing literature by providing an in-depth comparison of media coverage of an exemplary crisis
management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis
where the same organization seems to falter in comparison. Crisis managers may also benefit from
knowing that the media was not likely to provide an evaluation of J&J’s operational response or
reputation in either sample. This suggests that it may be possible for organizations to experience
crises of higher attribution, and still avoid a negative evaluation of their operational response or
unfavorable mention regarding their reputation.
Additionally, crisis managers should consider the possibility that journalists will be less
inclined to report information that appears to serve organizational interests; and more apt to
include information that serves the public’s interest. With this consideration, reputation
management strategies may be employed by the organization, but may not necessarily reach their
intended publics through newspaper coverage. News releases are a common channel for the
dissemination of reputation management strategies and they should continue to be used to convey
information to journalists and the public. However, crisis managers must recognize that the media
are not obligated to use them as a basis for their coverage of a crisis.
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Future Research

Future research should devote more attention to several examples of sustained crises that
occur over an extended period of time as shown by J&J’s current set of recalls. The 1982 recall
pertained to a fairly restricted situation in contrast to the current crises that are highlighting a
multitude of problems. An extended view of the crisis management process might add insights into
variables that hold additional explanatory value. In addition, comparisons could be offered between
crisis management strategies used in extended versus more restricted crises.
Additionally, future research on the J&J case could focus more on the timing of the current
recalls to see if there was a turning point where the news coverage surrounding J&J’s recalls went
from favorable to unfavorable. This could further support the SSCT premise of performance history
by showing if repeated coverage regarding J&J’s recalls could have possibly led to less favorable
news coverage depictions. Timing could also be used to examine whether or not the use of certain
reputation management strategies changes as time progressed in both the current sample and the
1982 coverage. If a study could establish a timeframe that certain reputation management
strategies were employed, the results might provide an indication of how organizations act and
respond during various stages of crises.
Further examination of J&J’s current crises could also group similar crises together to see if
there are differences in the reputation management strategies used as well as information-giving
strategies. This consideration should be made because the nature of J&J’s current crises covers a
broad spectrum of issues such as moldy odors, faulty hip devices, pills that do not dissolve correctly
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and inaccurate labels on products to name a few. This study grouped these problems together
rather than treating them separately. It is possible that a more fine-grained analysis would reveal
differences in the coverage of the different types of products recalled by J&J.
The inclusion of trade publications could also add an interesting perspective on how
attribution of responsibility may be reported differently to the industry versus the general public. It
seems likely that crises within a particular industry might be reported differently to a more
“sympathetic” audience than to the general public.
The present study used media framing as a basis for research, so it was appropriate to
examine news coverage. However, future research could also examine the formal responses that
are issued directly from the organization to compare whether or not the news coverage is reporting
the organizational response and stance accurately. This research could involve comparing the
content of news releases to the content of media coverage of organizational responses.
Lastly, the data suggested that newspaper coverage is less likely to include reputation
management strategies than information giving strategies, which might indicate that they are more
receptive to information from third parties. Thus future research could examine how third party
organizations like the FDA express support or fail to support the organization that is experiencing
the crisis. This research could see if journalists report information from third parties, and if so,
whether this information seems to support the organization in crisis or vilify it. These issues all
provide useful considerations for future research investigations.
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Conclusion

The results of this study have further supported several of the basic premises of SCCT,
namely the relationship between crisis type and attribution of responsibility and crisis history. The
information gleaned from this research can inform crisis managers and possibly help them weather
crisis storms and reduce reputational harm to their organizations. These results could also be a
basis for communication scholars to address gaps in the literature that that do not speak to crises
that have occurred over extended periods of time.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF JOHNSON & JOHNSON RECALLS FROM
NOVEMBER 2009 – APRIL 2012
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Date

Brand Name

Product Description

Reason/Problem

Company
McNeil Consumer Healthcare,
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc.

12/18/2009

Tylenol

12/09/2010

Rolaids72

Rolaids Soft Chews

Foreign materials, including
metal and wood particles

McNeil Consumer Healthcare,
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc.

11/29/2010

Mylanta, Alternagel93

Mylanta and Alternagel
Liquid Products

Undeclared alcohol from
flavoring agents

Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharmaceuticals,
Co.

11/24/2010

Tylenol101

Tylenol Cold Liquid
Products

Labeling update

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

11/15/2010

Benadryl, Motrin117

Children's Benadryl,
Children's Motrin

Insufficiencies in the
development of the
manufacturing process

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

11/15/2010

Rolaids120

Uncharacteristic consistency or
texture

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

10/18/2010

Tylenol

Over the counter (OTC)
products, 8 Hour Caplets

Uncharacteristic smell

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

07/08/2010

Benadryl; Tylenol; Motrin

Over the counter (OTC)
products

Uncharacteristic smell

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

06/15/2010

Benadryl; Tylenol

Over the counter (OTC)
products

Uncharacteristic smell

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

01/15/2010

Motrin, Tylenol, Benedryl, more

Drug Products

Off-odor

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

12/21/2011

Motrin

Motrin IB Coated Tablets
and Motrin IB Coated
Caplets

May not dissolve as quickly as
intended

McNeil

06/28/2011

Tylenol

TYLENOL, Extra Strength
Caplets, 225 count

Uncharacteristic odor

McNeil Consumer Healthcare

06/17/2011

Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Patriot
Pharmaceuticals, LLC

RISPERDAL, 3mg tablets
and risperidone, 2mg
tablets

Uncharacteristic odor

Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

80

TOPAMAX®

TOPAMAX® (topiramate) 100mg
Tablets

Uncharacteristic Odor

Ortho-McNeil
Neurologics
Division

01/14/2011

TYLENOL, BENADRYL, SUDAFED PE

TYLENOL® 8 Hour, TYLENOL®
Arthritis Pain, and TYLENOL®
upper respiratory products, and
certain lots of BENADRYL®,
SUDAFED PE®, and SINUTAB®

Production records found
instances where equipment
cleaning procedures were
insufficient or that cleaning was
not adequately documented.

McNeil Consumer
Healthcare

02/17/2012

TYLENOL

Infants TYLENOL Oral
Suspension, 1 oz. Grape

difficulty using the Infants TYLENOL
SimpleMeasure dosing system

McNeil Consumer
Healthcare

Lotion

The lot exceeded bacterial
specifications.

Johnson &
Johnson
Consumer
Companies, Inc.

04/14/2011

01/27/2012

AVEENO® BABY CALMING COMFORT®

03/24/2011

ASR FEMORAL IMPLANT SIZE 55,
DEPUY ASR RESURFACING FEMORAL
HEADS,

Depuy
Orthopaedics, Inc.

*This list was compiled using a variety of searches on the FDA’s web site. Thus it may not include every recall issued during the specified time
period.
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APPENDIX B: CODING SCHEME
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APPENDIX C: JOHNSON & JOHNSON SUBSIDIARIES
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Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries

**Please note that this list is not comprehensive, but includes most of the subsidiaries
involved in recalls since December 2009.

















Advanced Sterilization Products
Animas Corporation
Cordis Corporation
DePuy, Inc.
DePuy Orthopaedics
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
Ethicon, Inc.
Janssen
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.
LifeScan, Inc.
McNeil Consumer Healthcare
McNeil, PPC, Inc.
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.
Virco BVBA
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APPENDIX D: TABLE OF DATA FREQUENCIES
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Variable

Category

1982 Coverage

Current Coverage

Positive

3.6% (n=1)

4.9% (n=2)

Negative

0%

24.4% (n=10)

Both Positive and Negative

0%

0%

No Evaluation

96.4% (n=27)

70.7% (n=29)

Favorable

3.5% (n=1)

0%

Unfavorable

3.5% (n=1)

17% (n=7)

No Mention

93% (n=26)

83% (n=34)

Victim

35.7% (n=10)

0%

Accident

0%

24% (n=10)

Preventable

0%

22% (n=9)

No Crisis Type Mentioned

64.3% (n=18)

54% (n=22)

Mention of Previous
Recalls

Yes

0%

19.5% (n=8)

No

100% (n=28)

80.5% (n=33)

Mention of 1982 Recall

Yes

N/A

7.3% (n=3)

No

N/A

92.7% (n=38)

Inclusion of Instructing
Information

Yes

32.1% (n=9)

51.2% (n=21)

No

67.9% (n=19)

48.8% (n=20)

Inclusion of Adjusting
Information

No

60.7% (n=17)

61% (n=25)

Yes

39.3% (n=11)

39% (n=16)

Description of
Reputation
Management Strategy

Attack the Accuser

0%

0%

Denial

0%

10.4% (n=5)

Scapegoat

0%

6.3% (n=3)

Suffering

28% (n=5)

0%

Excuse

0%

6.3% (n=3)

Deny Volition

0%

0%

Justification

6% (n=1)

27.1% (n=13)

Evaluation of
Operational Response

Evaluation of
Reputation

Description of Crisis
Type
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Description of
Reputation
Management Strategy
Continued

Strategic Response
Categories

Compensation

39% (n=7)

12.5% (n=6)

Apology

0%

6.3% (n=3)

Repentance

6% (n=1)

0%

Rectification

22% (n=4)

25% (n=12)

Bolstering

0%

6.3% (n=3)

Transcendence

0%

0%

Ingratiation

0%

0%

Deny

27.8% (n=5)

17% (n=8)

Diminish

56% (n=1)

33% (n=16)

Rebuild

66.7% (n=12)

43.8% (n=21)

Reinforce

0%

6.3% (n=3)
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